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This paper simulates a consensus based decision-making approach for water allocation. A nontrivial three-user allocation problem is considered. Upon availability of water surplus (from an
exogenous source), the users in deficit demand a share. In contrast to conflict style decision
making, they want (or are forced) to resolve this allocation process by consensus building, i.e.,
the users desire (or should arrive at) an allocation solution agreeable to all. We simulate this
decision-making process by the game theoretic approach of Rausser-Simon (Adams, et al.,
1991), a multilateral bargaining model. The players (users) in this game are motivated to bargain
for a share by their payoff functional, which they desire to maximize1. Furthermore, the players
are motivated not to reach a disagreement by their disagreement payoff (the payoff they realize if
the process fails)2. This model therefore provides a useful instrument to understand the
dynamics of such a decision making process. To illustrate its usefulness, we study the influence
on the water allocation solution of having insufficient information about conveyance losses. The
conveyance loss is the physical loss in transporting allocated water from the source of surplus to
its point of use. Insufficiency is measured by the uncertainty in loss estimation faced by one of
the players. It is inferred from our simulation study that this uncertainty distorts the allocation
solution. As a result of this uncertainty, all the players incur economic losses in the solution
payoff, with the player facing the uncertainty being most affected. This leads us to conclude that
all the players would be willing to pay for more information on conveyance loss even though
only one player is faced with such information insufficiency. However, the respective portions
of total expenditure would depend on their individual willingness to pay (WTP) for a particular
decrement in uncertainty. Assuming all the players have perfect information about the payoff
functions and the surplus amount, this tool therefore enables us to inquire about the viability of
any effort to obtain additional information, and also sheds some light on sharing such a
responsibility.
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Under the assumption of rationality that the players always attempt to maximize their utility
the lower the disagreement payoff, the more the players are motivated not to let the decision-making process fail

